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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

Navigable Waters: Rights of State and Riparian Owners in
Navigable Waters; Water Power Rights.
A case of great importance to Wisconsin has recently been affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court: Fox River Paper Company v.
Railroad Commission.'
This case involved the constitutionality of a recent Wisconsin Statute
which, it was contended, violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution in that it took property without due process of law.
The problem involved was in substance that by Section 31.02, Wisconsin Statutes 1925, the State Railroad Commission was given supervisory power over the navigable waters of the state, and control of the
construction and maintenance of dams in navigable rivers. Section
31.07 authorizes the Railroad Commission to grant permits to applicants to operate and maintain existing dams. By Section 31.09 every
applicant for a permit is required to file with his application proposals
in writing, consenting, among other things, to the grant of a permit
subject to the condition:
"That the State of Wisconsin or any municipality, not less than one
year's notice, at any time after the expiration of thirty years after the
permit becomes effective, may acquire all of the property of the grantee,
used and useful under the permit, by paying therefore, the cost of
reproduction in their then existing condition of all dams, works, buildings, or other structures or equipment, used and useful under the permit as determined by the commission, and by paying, in addition thereto,
the value of the dam site and all flowage rights and other property as
determined by the commission prior to the time the permit was granted,
as provided in subsection (i) plus the amounts paid out for additional
flowage rights, if any, acquired after the valuation made by the commission as provided in subsection (i) and that the applicant waives all
right to any further compensation."
The plaintiffs contended that the Railroad Commission, acting under
the statute, deprived the plaintiffs of their property without due process
of law. That by the law of Wisconsin, the rights vested in riparian
owners include-the right to use the water power for that purpose to dam
the river, subject only to the exercise by the state of its police power to
regulate the use of navigable waters in the public interest.
The trial court held, and such holding was affirmed by the higher
courts, that the right of the riparian owner to make use of the water
power in a navigable river by maintaining a dam is subordinate to the
power of the state to regulate the use of obstructions in navigable
waters; that the state may forbid all obstruction by dam or otherwise;
that the right of the riparian owners to develop the water power by the
construction of the dam remains inchoate until the state has given its
consent.
"If the legislature may wholly refuse permission to erect a dam or
other structure in the navigable waters of the state, it follows that it
may grant such permission upon such terms as it shall determine will
best protect the interests of the public."
147 Sup. Ct. Rep. 669.

NOTES'AND COMMENT

The United States Supreme Court held:
"Though the title to soil under navigable waters within the state is
presumptively in state, the nature and extent of the rights of the state
and of riparian owners in navigable waters within the state, and to soil
beneath such waters, are matters of state law, to be determined by state
statutes and judicial decisions.'
Also that:
"It is the function of state courts to define rights in land located
within the state, and in the absence of an attempt to forestall Supreme
Court's review of constitutional questions, the Fourteenth Amendment
affords no protection to supposed rights of property which state courts
determine to be nonexistent."
This case has done a great deal to reclaim to the people of Wisconsin the valuable water power rights which have been exploited in the
past, with other natural resources. Our water power has an enormous
potential as well as present value. As the state continues to grow the
power rights will become increasingly valuable and now the state has
a safety valve with which to protect such a valuable right.
ELMER GOODLAND

Frauds, Statute of: no quantum meruit recovery on oral real
estate contract by broker.
This is an appeal from a judgment for the reasonable value of
services performed by a firm of real estate brokers. The original complaint was on contract for service, but since the contract for performance of such service was not in writing, the complaint was
amended to set up a cause of action on quantum meruit. The evidence
established the fact that the oral contract between the parties provided
for a payment of commission when the purchaser had paid $5,000 or
more on the purchase price. Such amount was never paid, and the
purchaser, after a few payments, refused both to make further payments and to take the land ifn question.
Held 24O.1O Wis. Stats. extending the statute of frauds to include
real estate brokers' contracts, precluded a recovery on quantum meruit.
Where there is no written agreement between the vendor and the
broker, the employment and consequent agreement to pay commissions
may be implied from the circumstances; I such implication being based
on the conduct of the parties, as where the principle accepts the broker's
services with the knowledge that he expects to be paid, or where he
places property in the hands of a broker and a sale is effected through
the efforts of the broker. 2 Therefore, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, a contract employing a broker for the purchase
or sale of lands need not be in writing and he may accordingly recover

for services rendered under an oral contract. 3 Under some statutes,

however, written authority is required, and where such statute exists,
*Hale v. Kriesel, -

Wis. -; 215 N.W. 227.
'82 Conn. 557; 120 Cal. 551; 52 Colo. 205.
2 146

Ky. 439; 48 Wash. 364.

'C. J. Vol. IX 558.

